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NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE. By JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L.
KORN, AND ARTHUR R. MILLER. New York: Matthew Bender & Co.,
Inc., 1963. Set of eight looseleaf volumes. $196.
The recent enactment of a new code of civil procedure and
practice by the State of New York has aroused considerable
interest in other jurisdictions, especially those where similar revi-
sion is under discussion. (Ed.)
At the writing of this review six volumes of the treatise have been
distributed to the legal profession. Two of the volumes are still
incomplete. The missing portions and two more volumes will be
published shortly.
Adolf Homburger t
A review of a work of this magnitude presents obvious difficulties. An
exhaustive study of the thousands of pages of the treatise now on the shelf
would not have been possible in the short time since publication of the
materials, some of which were distributed only a few weeks prior to the
writing of this review. However, I believe that a preliminary evaluation
may be based upon the impressions gained by a law teacher and former
practitioner in the day-to-day use of the available text and upon the
scrutiny at close range of a topic selected for the purpose of this Review.
The final evaluation of the work after its completion must be made in the
light of experience gathered over a number of years when the treatise has
been exposed to the test of scholarly debate and extensive use on the battle-
grounds of litigation.
Before attempting to judge the substance of the work, proper criteria
for its evaluation should be fixed. The authors have indicated that it is
their desire to place their work "before the Bench and Bar for whatever
assistance it may give, in time for its use as the CPLR comes into opera-
tion." I Assuming, therefore, that the principal purpose of the treatise is
to assist judges, lawyers, and perhaps teachers, students, and legislators
in the era of the new Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New
York,2 it would seem that the work should measure up to three basic tests.
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. D.U.J. 1928,
University of Vienna; LL.B. 1941, University of Buffalo. Member, New York Bar.
1 Preface to 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE at xviii
(1963) [hereinafter cited as WKM].2 Effective Sept. 1, 1963. "This chapter shall be known as the civil practice law
and rules, and may be cited as CPLR [N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES]... . Refer-
ence to a provision . . . may, except when such provision is being enacted or amended,
be made without indicating whether it is a rule or section." N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW
& RULES § 101 (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 252, § 101). However, this Book Review
will refer to rules and sections; all such references are to the CPLR.
"The CPLR is perhaps unique in that it contains both a civil practice law and
rules of civil practice in a single integrated document .... " WKM f 101.01.
(1222)
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First, it should be sufficiently comprehensive to provide information on all
important topics, particularly in areas where the law has been changed.
This may be called the encyclopedic objective. Next, it should be educa-
tional, aiding the reader in a deeper understanding of the subject by
scientific classification and illuminating discussion. Again this requirement
applies with particular force to areas of the law where there have been
significant changes. This may be called the analytical objective. Finally,
it should be imaginative, looking into the future, discovering trends, and
participating in the shaping of the law that ought-to-be. This may be
called the creative objective.
Before stating my general conclusions in the light of these tests, which
I do in the latter part of the Review, I shall examine in some detail the
portions of the treatise dealing with personal jurisdiction, appearance, and
motions raising jurisdictional objections. These are areas of the law where
changes of more than local significance have taken place and thus furnish
a good testing ground.
I. JURISDIcTION
A. The Expansion of Jurisdictional Bases: Sections 301 and 302
The CPLR has made drastic changes in the area of judicial jurisdiction.
It retains all prior bases for exercising jurisdiction over persons,3 including
particularly physical presence of the defendant and "doing business" by
corporate entities within the state at the time of the suit's commencement.
In addition it extends vastly the reach of New York courts by enacting
a "single-act," or as it is sometimes called, "long-arm" statute. Section 302
gives the court personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries as to a cause of
action arising within the state from any of the following acts: the transac-
tion of any business; the commission of a tortious act (with a minor ex-
ception) ; and the ownership, use, or possession of real property.4
The authors' treatment of this subject exemplifies their analytical
talents. A brief introduction familiarizes the reader with the three essential
prerequisites for the exercise of judicial power: jurisdiction over the
3 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw & RULES § 301.
4 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAWv & RunFzs § 302 provides as follows:
Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries.
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or adminis-
trator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this
section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in
person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action
for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
(b) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely
upon this section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction with respect
to causes of action not arising from an act enumerated in this section.
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subject matter, basis, and reasonable notice.' At an early point the reader
is reminded of the limits set upon the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by the
due process clauses of the State and United States constitutions and of the
necessity for the existence of state authority to exercise jurisdiction within
these limits.' Attention is called, in a brief discussion, to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.7  The authors anticipate a great future for that
doctrine as a device against the overextension of personal jurisdiction
over nondomiciliaries under the single-act statute and possibly also against
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over transients on claims which are
unrelated to the state." There is no doubt that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens could be utilized to accomplish these ends were it not for the
fact that the New York courts are committed to a rejection of that doctrine
in actions brought by New York residents. 9
The all-important problem of basis is discussed under five headings:
(1) presence of the defendant when the action is commenced; (2) con-
tinued presence of the defendant; (3) contacts related to the cause of action;
(4) use of New York courts by defendant's appearance in court; and (5)
presence of a res in New York.'0
I would have preferred a classification which places more emphasis
upon the distinction between personal jurisdiction based on a past intrastate
contact related to the cause of action and personal jurisdiction based on a
relationship existing at the time of the commencement of the suit. This
approach would have highlighted the growing strength of the idea that
"presence" of the defendant in the state at the commencement of the action,
although still considered sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction, is no
longer necessary to establish a jurisdictional basis in many cases." The
idea that once a nondomiciliary has established sufficient contact with
the state there exists a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction as to a
related cause of action, so that the remaining problem is merely being one
of reasonable notice, is still novel to New York lawyers. Holding fast to the
Pennoyeran jurisdictional tradition ' 2 and to the equation of power with
basis,' 3 the New York lawyers still hobble along on the crutches of "implied
consent," "implied appointment of an agent," and the fiction of "presence"
5 WKM 1111 301.01-.04.
6 WKM 301.05.
7 WKM 1 301.07.
8 WKM f 301.12.
' Gross v. Cross, 28 Misc. 2d 375, 211 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Marx v.
Katz, 20 Misc. 2d 1084, 195 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Wagner v. Braunsberg,
5 App. Div. 2d 564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1958). See also De La Bouillerie v. De
Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949); WKM ff 301.07 n.18.
10 WKM T 301.10-.21.
11 Cf. SCHLESINGER, COmPARATIVE LAw 212-13 (2d ed. 1959).
12 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflicts of Laws, Some Comments
on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. PuB. L. 313 (1960).
But see EHRENzWEIG, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 103-06, 119 (1962); Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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of foreign corporate entities by "doing business" within the state. 14
Reared in the tradition that presence in the state at the commencement of
the suit is a sine qua non for personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries,
they are accustomed to consider the New York Nonresident Motorist
Statute' 5 as an instance of implied appointment of an agent and exercise
of police power rather than a contact statute. International Shoe'16 had
its chief significance in New York as a rationalization of the fiction of
"presence" of unauthorized foreign corporations by "doing business."
Personal jurisdiction over absent New York domiciliaries, though not based
on physical presence of the defendant, likewise presupposed an existing
relationship at the commencement of the suit. And the few instances of true
contact jurisdiction in New York which antedate the CPLR .7 were too
limited in scope to make a dent in the conceptual approach of the New York
lawyer. The much broader provisions of section 302 now require a com-
plete reorientation with respect to the subject of personal jurisdiction.
Praise is due the authors for their critical examination of New York's
long-arm statute.'8 According to the authors, "it is not clear that the New
York provision needs to be interpreted, as is that of Illinois, as going to
the outer limits of permissible jurisdiction." 19 Even though the Advisory
Committee in its statement of objectives announced that the jurisdictional
sections have been drafted "to take full advantage of the state's constitu-
tional power of persons and things," 20 there are indications in the notes
of the Committee that the section was designed to subject nondomiciliaries
to personal jurisdiction only when they commit acts within the state.
2 1
The authors' viewpoint has been adopted by New York courts in recent
decisions involving claims for product liability against out-of-state
manufacturers.
22
There is a full discussion of the recurrent question of applicability of
the jurisdictional provisions in situations where the defendant's act on
14 See Note, Developments it the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Hxv. L.
REV. 909 (1960).
15 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAYFic LAW § 253. See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 250
(applicable to operation of aircraft within the state).
' 6lnternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1
7 E.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 150-a; N.Y. INs. LAW § 59-a; N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-b.
IS See note 4 supra.
19 WKM 1 302.01.
20 N.Y. TEMPORARY Comex_ ON THE COURTS (ADVISORY COMm'I ON PRACTICE
& PRO EDURE), SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT 37 (1958).
2 1 Id. at 39.
22See Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct 1964);
Feathers v. McLukas, 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963). See also
Irgang v. Pelton & Crane Co., 42 Misc. 2d 70, 247 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct 1964)
(shipping of nondomiciliary's products to New York dealer who paid for deliveries
by mailing remittances from New York held not to constitute transaction of any
business within the state in the absence of other significant contacts). But see
Fornabaio v. Swissair Transp. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 182, 247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
1964]
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which jurisdiction is based preceded the effective date of the law.3 Subse-
quent decisions of New York courts sustain the authors' viewpoint that
jurisdiction should be upheld in these cases.2
The vital question of what constitutes the transaction of any business
within the meaning of section 302 (a) (1) is given a comparatively slight
treatment in the treatise.m The authors are unquestionably correct when
they point out that the statutory phrase "transacts any business within the
state" may refer to one single transaction, and that it should not be con-
fused with the concept of "doing business" required to establish "presence"
in the traditional sense of the territorial doctrine of jurisdiction.
26  How-
ever, the meaning of the word "business" is obscure and needs clarification.
No explanation of the statutory language is offered either in the notes of the
Advisory Committee or in the treatise. Will the trend be towards a
technical and narrow interpretation or will a liberal interpretation prevail?
What are the policy considerations in support of one or the other?
If the courts were intent on giving a restrictive interpretation to the
statutory language, it might possibly be construed as referring to single
commercial transactions within the state in the business or trade in which
the nondomiciliary is generally engaged outside the state. Although most
cases reported in other jurisdictions are concerned with transactions of
that kind,27 it is unlikely that the courts will give such restrictive inter-
pretation to the phrase. The use of nontechnical language by the statute
would seem to invite a nontechnical interpretation. The word "transacts"
points to any kind of voluntary dealing between plaintiff and defendant
within the state. Common usage would indicate that the word "business"
may refer to any isolated bargaining transaction within the state, such as
the purchase of an automobile by a transient tourist or an agreement for
rendering services, professional or nonprofessional, by or to the non-
domiciliary.28 Until the meaning of the statute has been clarified by judicial
decision, a transient tourist might be subject to litigation in New York on
tenuous claims arising from his activities far away from his home. Per-
haps he could stake his hopes on the wording of section 302 which says
that the court "may" rather than "shall" exercise personal jurisdiction.
23 WKM 302.04.
2 4 William Rand, Inc. v. Joyas De Fantasia, S.A., 41 Misc. 2d 838, 246 N.Y.S.2d
778 (Sup. Ct 1964); Developers Small Business Inv. Corp. v. Puerto Rico Land
& Dev. Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 23, 246 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Steele v. DeLeeuw,
40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct 1963). See also Muraco v. Ferentino,
42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
25 WKM 1 302.06-.08.
2o WKM 1 302.06. The authors' viewpoint was sustained in subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Developers Small Business Inv. Corp. v. Puerto Rico Land & Dev. Corp.,
42 Misc. 2d 23, 246 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Jump v. Duplex Vending Corp.,
41 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Steele v. DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d
807, 244 N.Y.S2d 97 (Sup. Ct 1963).
27 See cases reported in ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 110, § 17 (Jenner & Tone Supp.
1963); WIs. STAT. ANN. §262.05, Revision Notes (Supp. 1964). For recent New
York cases, see notes 22, 24, 26 supra.
28 Cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.05, Revision Notes, at 28 (Supp. 1964).
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It would seem that this permissive language vests the court with a broad
discretionary power to decline jurisdiction even in cases where under the
present law the doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable. 29
Notwithstanding the broad sweep of the section, there remains a
residue of activities which cannot easily be fitted into the concept of "trans-
acting any business within the state." Suppose that a nondomiciliary, while
present in the state, impregnates a woman who thereafter institutes
paternity proceedings to press a claim for support of her child and for
expenses incurred in connection with her pregnancy 30 The state in that
case would have an interest in permitting the prosecution of the claim in the
mother's home state since filiation proceedings touch basic moral and eco-
nomic interests of society. Likewise, the many legal consequences which
flow from the making of a gift may raise a question as to whether a non-
domiciliary by making or accepting the gift within the state has "transacted
any business" there. Activities of this kind would not come within the
purview of the single-act statute unless the court were willing to equate
the phrase "transacts any business within the state" with "doing of an act
within the state which produces legal consequences." The authors do not
concern themselves with these questions except in their discussion of
quasi in rem jurisdiction where they express doubt that "matrimonial ac-
tivities" are covered by the single-act statute.3 ' It may be surmised that
"extra-matrimonial activities," as well as other activities commonly not
associated with "business," will be likewise excluded even though they
established a firm "contact" with the state.
The treatise contains a lucid and thorough discussion of tort cases en-
compassed by the long-arm statute. The problem posed by the jurisdic-
tional threshold question, whether a tortious act has been committed by the
defendant in New York, and the effect (or rather lack of effect) of the
determination of that question upon the merits of the case receive careful
treatment 3 2 Particular attention is given to products-liability cases where
the negligent act occurred without the state and the injury within the
state.33 Illinois case law and the Illinois model, on which section 302 is
based, as well as the corresponding provisions of the recent Uniform Inter-
29 See note 9 supra.
30 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Act § 513, 514, 515, 521, 525. See also N.Y. FAmILy
CT. Acr § 165 providing: "Where the method of procedure in any proceeding in
which the family court has jurisdiction is not prescribed, the provisions of the civil
practice law and rules shall apply to the extent that they are appropriate to the pro-
ceedings involved."
31 WKM 1f 314.04.32 WKM 1f 302.09.
n WKM 11 302.10 contains an illuminating discussion of Gray v. American Radi-
ator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which the
Illinois court sustained the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary
whose product caused injury within the state as the result of a tortious act done
outside the state. New York cases decided since the effective date of the CPLR
are divided on this point. Compare Fornabaio v. Swissair Transp. Co., 42 Misc. 2d
182, 247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1964), with Feathers v. McLukas, 41 Misc. 2d 498,
245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
1964] 1227
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state and International Procedure Act and the Wisconsin statute are care-
fully examined. The authors conclude their discussion of section 302 with
a brief analysis of the broad provision conferring personal jurisdiction over
nondomiciliaries in connection with causes of action arising from the owner-
ship, use, or possession of any kind of interest in New York real property,
including tenancies.
3 4
B. Trends in Jurisdiction
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in International
Shoe gave impetus to a trend towards easier acquisition of personal juris-
diction over nondomiciliaries. The trend has gained momentum during
the past decade.35 Has it spent its force 36 or will it continue in the future?
If it continues, will there be a further piecemeal expansion of the contact
doctrine? May we expect the gradual emergence of a doctrine of forum
conveniens, accompanied by the eventual demise of the "transient rule" of
jurisdiction? 37 Or are we perhaps moving towards "an institution akin
to that of civil-law competency (subject-matter jurisdiction on a national
basis combined with procedural safeguards as to notice and fair hear-
ing)" ? 3s The authors' views on these questions would have been welcomed
by the reader.
Of particular interest to both theoretician and practitioner would have
been the question whether, within constitutional limits, the contact doctrine
may be finally converted into a workable doctrine of forum conveniens. In
International Shoe the United States Supreme Court fixed the outer limits
to which states may constitutionally extend their judicial jurisdiction in
personam over nondomiciliaries in terms of "'fair play and substantial
justice.' "-9 An " 'estimate of inconveniences'" is relevant in this con-
nection.40 "[T]he trend in defining due process of law is away from
the emphasis on territorial limitations [and thus] . . . from the court
with immediate power over the defendant, toward the court in which both
parties can most conveniently settle their dispute." 41 While the states have
made forays toward this borderline of constitutionality with increasing fre-
34 WKM 1 302.12.
35 See statutes collated in Columbia University Project on International Procedure,
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, app. A; Weinstein, Trends in
Civil Practice, 62 CoLum. L. Rv. 1431, 1435 (1962).
36 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) ; cf. cases cited note 22 supra, which evi-
dence a trend towards a restrictive interpretation of the new jurisdictional provision
of the CPLR.
37 See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 72, 119 (1962) ; EHRENZWEIG & LoUIsELL,
JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL § 57 (1964).
38 Ehrenzweig, Ehrenzweig in Reply, 9 J. PUB. L. 328, 334 (1960) ; see Cleary,
The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PUB. L. 293, 296-97 (1960). See generally
Transient Jurisdictio*-Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff, A Round Table, 9 J. PUB. L.
281 (1960) (collected essays).
39 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
40 Id. at 317.
41 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 440-41,
176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961).
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quency and on a widening basis, they have not as yet taken full advantage of
the opportunities offered by that decision and by the followup cases. State
legislation proceeded in a haphazard, casuistic, and unsystematic fashion by
enacting various statutes addressed to specific contact situations. At times
they came to a halt a considerable distance away from the constitutional
boundary line. At other times they attempted to cross it, incurring the
penalty of unconstitutionality4 2 Whole areas of potential jurisdiction over
nondomiciliaries were left untapped. New section 302, although proceeding
on a broader front than its statutory forerunners, still follows the pattern
of a limited and ill-defined piecemeal approach.
If we assume that further jurisdictional expansion through implementa-
tion of the contact doctrine is likely, and that a continuing relaxation of
the strict rules of territorial jurisdiction within constitutional limits is
dictated by our expanding complex economy and the interstate multiplicity
of human relations, one wonders whether the New York approach is sound.
Perhaps a more flexible comprehensive provision which utilizes the "con-
tact" doctrine but emphasizes the convenience aspects of that doctrine
would have been preferable. I realize that a general provision of this kind
might be subject to criticism on the ground that it would lack definiteness
and predictability,43 but such criticism could perhaps be met by pointing
to the large area of present uncertainty in section 302 and in the traditional
"doing business" test. Moreover, it might be possible to create an element
of certainty by setting up guideposts limiting the scope of judicial discre-
tion. Various criteria emphasized in the case law dealing with the con-
stitutionality and construction of long-arm statutes could be used in estab-
lishing such guideposts oriented towards convenience and "fair play." For
example, the statute might provide that the court, in ruling on the question
of jurisdiction, shall consider the relative significance of any part of the
transaction or occurrence which took place outside the state; the law which
would apply if the court exercised jurisdiction; the convenience of witnesses
and parties; the amenability of the defendant to personal jurisdiction in
another state; and the existence of facts and circumstances tending to sup-
port the conclusion that the nondomiciliary did expect, or should reasonably
have expected, that claims against him might arise within the state. None
of these factors should necessarily be conclusive; however, they would be
relevant as a matter of law and the court would be dutybound to consider
them in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case 44
42 Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) ; see
Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1953). Compare N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 250 in its original form, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1952, ch. 748, § 250, with
the section as amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 148, § 250, and by N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1958, ch. 378, § 250.
43 See EHRENZWEIG & LOUISELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 169 (1964).
44 See Jaffe, Jvdicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 239, 248 (1955),
pointing out three ways in which a rule may function: it may isolate a fact as deter-
minative; it may provide that a fact is relevant but not conclusive; and it may specify
facts which are irrelevant. "The second type directs or channels the exercise of
discretion but cannot exclusively determine it." Id. at 249; cf. N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
LAW & RULES § 1001.
1230 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112
II. APPEARANCE AND MOTIONS RAISING OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION
Rule 320 introduces two major innovations relating to the crucial
problem of asserting objections to jurisdiction over the person or property
of the defendant: (1) it abandons the ancient distinction between a special
appearance and a general appearance; and (2) it outlaws the so-called
"limited" appearance.
45
A special appearance should not be confused with a limited appearance.
A special appearance is a procedural device, widely used in the United
States, which enables the defendant to appear solely for the purpose of
raising the jurisdictional question, and if so limited does not subject the
defendant to the consequences of a general appearance.
46 A limited appear-
ance, on the other hand, seeks to avoid conversion of in rem jurisdiction
into personal jurisdiction by defending the action on the merits. It enables
the defendant to appear "for purposes of litigating the merits but limited
to those claims which could be constitutionally adjudicated by the court
in his absence by virtue of its in rem jurisdiction." 47
Special appearances are no longer required in New York. It is clear
under the new statute that a defendant may raise objections to the exercise
of personal or in rem jurisdiction along with any other defenses going to
the merits of plaintiff's claim by motion or in his answer without waiving
the jurisdictional objection. 48 On the other hand the door to a limited
45 Rule 320, as far as here pertinent, provides as follows:
Defendant's appearance.
(a) Requirement of appearance. The defendant appears by serving an
answer or a notice of appearance, or by making a motion which has the
effect of extending the time to answer . ..
(b) When appearance confers personal jurisdiction, generally. Subject
to the provisions of subdivision (c), an appearance of the defendant is equiva-
lent to personal service of the summons upon him, unless an objection to
jurisdiction under paragraph eight of subdivision (a) of rule 3211 is asserted
at the time of appearance by motion or in the answer.
(c) When appearance confers personal jurisdiction, in certain actions.
In a case specified in section 314 where the court's jurisdiction is not based
upon personal service on the defendant, an appearance is not equivalent to
personal service of the summons upon the defendant if an objection to juris-
diction under paragraphs eight or nine of subdivision (a) of rule 3211, or
both, is asserted at the time of appearance by motion or in the answer, unless
the defendant proceeds with the defense after asserting the objection to juris-
diction and the objection is not ultimately sustained.
Section 314 provides for service without the state in in rein actions. Rules 3211(a) (8)
and (9) provide for motions directed to jurisdictional defects in in personam and
in rem actions.
46 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 20 (1942).
47 Frumer & Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant in
New York-A Proposed Solution, 19 FORDHAm L. REv. 125 (1950). The term "in
rem" jurisdiction also refers to cases of "quasi in ren" jurisdiction, and is used in
the same sense in this Review.
48 WKM f 320.09, 3211.02. Defendant appears by serving an answer or a notice
of appearance, or by "making a motion which has the effect of extending the time to
answer." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES R. 320(a). The last quoted phrase seems
ambiguous. Does it refer only to a motion which has the automatic "built-in" effect
of extending the time to answer or does it also include a motion which produces an
order extending the time to answer? Neither the notes of the Advisory Committee
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appearance has been closed. Rule 320 provides that a defendant who ap-
pears and "proceeds with the defense" of an in rem claim submits to in
personam jurisdiction unless an objection to the exercise of in rem jurisdic-
tion was timely raised and is sustained either by the court below or on
appeal.
49
The elimination of the limited appearance involves an important policy
decision. According to the notes of the Advisory Committee, "the con-
flicting policy considerations are simply stated: a rule prohibiting a limited
appearance forces the defendant to choose between defaulting on the in rem
claim or submitting to personal jurisdiction; on the other hand, it affords
a lever for obtaining personal jurisdiction over absent or non-resident de-
fendants, whereby all the claims between the parties may be settled at one
time and a multiplicity of suits avoided." -5 The same statement appears in
the treatise.51 Neither the notes nor the treatise, however, indicate why
the revisers decided against a limited appearance.
The CPLR makes no distinction between the three situations which
come under the heading of in rem jurisdiction: matrimonial actions; actions
involving property within the state; and actions in personam where plaintiff
created a basis for in rem jurisdiction by levy of an attachment.
52  Yet
there is a vital difference between these actions as judged by public policy
and procedural economy.
The sharpest distinction exists between actions involving marital status
and other types of actions. "Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not
merely to the immediate parties. It affects personal rights of the deepest
significance. It also touches basic interests of society." 5 Since the state
has an interest in the protection of the matrimonial relationship, it could be
argued that a defendant should not be discouraged from resisting an un-
justified attack on his matrimonial status by withholding from him the
privilege of making a limited appearance. Yet the Restatement of Judg-
inents, while permitting it in the attachment situation,54 does not sanction
a limited appearance in matrimonial actions. Actually, from the point of
view of procedural economy, a limited appearance is less desirable in attach-
ment cases than in the other cases. If after defendant's limited appearance
the plaintiff is successful, but the attached property is not sufficient to
satisfy his claim, then the plaintiff cannot rely on collateral estoppel when he
prosecutes another action to collect the balance of his claim. Similarly, if
nor the treatise elaborates. The only examples furnished by the notes and the
treatise are a motion to dismiss under rule 3211 and a motion to correct pleadings
under rule 3024(c). WKM 11320.04. Both motions have the automatic effect of
extending the time to answer.
49 WKM 11 320.17-.19. But see Lenhoff, Faculty Comment, 13 BUrrFALo L. R-v.
119, 128 (1963).
0 
ADvisoRy Comm'N ON PRAcrIcE & PROCEDURE, FOURTH PRELIMINARY REPORT
188 (1960).
51 WKM f 320.17.
52 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw & RuLEs § 314.
Us Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
5 4 RESTATMENT, JUDGMENTS § 40 (1942).
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the plaintiff is defeated he may prosecute a second action based on the same
claim after attaching other property of the defendant or subjecting him to
personal jurisdiction. Neither bar nor collateral estoppel would stand in
the way of the second action.55 The situation is different in matrimonial
actions and in actions involving property within the state where the judg-
ment disposes of all issues regardess of whether defendant made a general
or limited appearance.
The revisers might also have examined the policy considerations in-
volved in authorizing a "limited limited-appearance." It has been suggested
that defendant's limited appearance should subject him to personal juris-
diction only as to causes of action stated in the original complaint plus any
subsequently added which form part of the same transaction as the in rem
claim.56 This might be an acceptable compromise in actions involving
property within the state and in the attachment situation. It would hardly
be workable in matrimonial actions where as a practical matter the disposi-
tion of a claim for alimony is tied in with an adjustment of all mutual claims,
whether related or not.
Turning now to the technical provisions of the appearance statute, there
is an excellent discussion of the three categories of jurisdictional objections
specified in rules 3211 (a) (2), (8), and (9), namely lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, lack of in personam jurisdiction, and lack of in rem jurisdic-
tion.57 The CPLR for the first time has introduced a separate motion,
specifically directed to jurisdictional defects in in rem actions. The authors
attempt to define the areas covered by each of these objections. They point
out that a technical distinction between lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
(not waiveable) and lack of in rem jurisdiction (waiveable) is often
problematical since the absence of the res not only destroys the basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction in rem, but also deprives the court of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter.55 Likewise, a defendant may be faced with a
delicate problem where plaintiff asked for in personam relief although he
obtained only in rem jurisdiction. Under rule 3211 the defendant has
only a choice between a motion to dismiss a cause of action because the
court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,59 and a motion
that the court has no jurisdiction in an in rem action where service was
made either by publication or outside the state without giving personal
jurisdiction.60 The authors conclude that until experience clarifies the
practice, a defendant would be wise to move under both paragraphs in
that situation.
61
, Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (6th Cir.
1922) ; Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916) ; RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 40, comment a; see Note, "Special" Appearance To Contest
the Merits in Attachment Suits, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 403, 406 (1949).
56 Frumer & Graziano, supra note 47, at 125, 151.
57 WKM 1l f 3211.08-.23.
-58 WK1M f[ 3211.21.
59 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw & RULES R. 3211 (a) (8).




There is a related problem, not discussed in the treatise, which stems
from a lack of coordination between New York's long-arm statute (section
302(b)) and the appearance rule in in rem actions (rule 320(c)). 2 As
stated above, rule 320(c) denies a defendant the right to make a limited
appearance. Therefore, if defendant has no jurisdictional objection and
"proceeds with the defense," he subjects himself to jurisdiction in personam.
On the other hand the long-arm statute recognizes a sort of "limited" ap-
pearance. Section 302(b) provides: "Where personal jurisdiction is based
solely upon this section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction
with respect to causes of action not arising from an act enumerated in this
section." 3 Suppose a New York plaintiff has a substantial claim against
a Pennsylvania resident based on commission of a tortious act in New
York. Suppose further that defendant has no other contact with New York
except that he owns a savings account in a New York bank. Plaintiff,
prior to serving the defendant personally in Pennsylvania, makes a levy on
that savings account pursuant to an order of attachment.64 There is no
question that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under section
302 (a) (2). Consequently, even if he were willing to abandon his New
York property, he could not afford to default since the judgment would be
entitled to full faith and credit in Pennsylvania. He therefore must appear
in the action and "proceed with the defense." Has he now subjected himself
to unlimited jurisdiction in personam as provided in rule 320(c) because
the court's personal jurisdiction is no longer based solely upon section 302?
If so, plaintiff could amend the complaint and assert other unrelated in
personam claims which he may have against the defendant. I doubt that
the draftsmen intended such a result. It is perhaps arguable that under the
hypothetical fact situation the attachment served only a security purpose
since the defendant was subject to in personam jurisdiction under the long-
arm statute. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant "proceeded with
the defense," personal jurisdiction over the defendant nondomiciliary is
still based solely on section 302 and not on rule 320(c), and an attempt to
amend the complaint could be resisted by a motion to dismiss the added
cause of action under rule 3211(a) (8).65 The same result would be reached
if section 302(b) were construed as limiting the effect of a subsequent
appearance whenever the original acquisition of personal jurisdiction was
based solely on the long-arm statute.
66
2 See note 45 supra.
63 Emphasis added.
64 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 6201 (1).
65 Cf. Everitt v. Everitt, 4 N.Y.2d 13, 16, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838, 148 N.E.2d
891, 893 (1958) (dictum) : "It may well be that if an action has been commenced
against a nonresident by the service of a summons and complaint, the complaint
cannot be amended by adding new causes of action after the defendant has left the
State . . . ." See generally Lenhoff, Justice Halpern's Contribution to Conflict of
Laws, 13 BuFFALo L. REv. 317, 319-21 (1964).
66 A motion by the defendant to vacate the attachment pursuant to § 6223 after
defendant's appearance on the ground that the attachment is unnecessary to the
security of the plaintiff probably would be of no avail. That provision "is intended
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A final question deserves brief consideration. By permitting jurisdic-
tional objections to be raised along with other defenses by motion or in the
answer and by outlawing at the same time the limited appearance, the
revisers created a problem of procedural mechanics. A point had to be fixed
in the chronology of litigation at which the defendant, by participation in the
litigation of an in rem claim, incurs the consequences of a general appear-
ance. Since special appearances were abolished, this point had to follow the
assertion of the jurisdictional objection by motion or in the answer. The
revisers fixed this point at the moment when defendant "proceeds with the
defense." However, the meaning of this term is quite obscure. Suppose
defendant interposes an answer or serves motion papers asserting lack of
in rem jurisdiction and other defenses going to the merits. Surely he has
not "proceeded with the defense" at that moment.67 But assume that
thereafter defendant places the case on the calendar and proceeds to trial,
confining, however, his participation solely to issues pertaining to the ques-
tion of in rem jurisdiction. Has he proceeded with the defense? Would a
demand for change of venue, 8 a motion for security for costs,O or the argu-
ment of a motion under rule 3211 on any ground other than lack of juris-
diction constitute "proceeding with the defense"? Could it perhaps be
argued that defendant has not "proceeded with the defense" unless he
presents evidence after denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint at the
close of plaintiff's case? Neither the notes of the Advisory Committee nor
the treatise considers the problem.7
0
to permit vacatur of an attachment that was sought solely, or primarily, for juris-
dictional reasons, after that function has been served." N.Y. ADvisoRY CoMM'N ON
PRACTICE & PROcEDuRE, THIRD PRELIMINARY REPoRT 358 (1959). It is unlikely that
the court would grant the motion where defendant is a nonresident individual or a
foreign corporation not doing business in the state since there is a presumption that
the local property of said defendant is less likely to be available to satisfy a judgment
than that of a resident. See id. at 144-46.
67 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw & RuLEs R. 320(c) provides that an appearance is not
equivalent to personal service of the summons upon the defendant if a jurisdictional
objection is asserted "unless the defendant proceeds with the defense after asserting the
objection to jurisdiction and the objection is not ultimately sustained." (Emphasis
added.) See note 45 mupra.
68 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES R. 511.
09 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 8501.
70 There is an excellent and elaborate discussion in the treatise of a serious incon-
sistency between rules 320(b) and 3211. The former requires the assertion of juris-
dictional objections "at the time of the appearance by motion or in the answer." The
latter permits jurisdictional objections to be raised by motion or in the answer, but
does not require their assertion at the time of the appearance. It follows that under
rule 3211 a defendant could raise a jurisdictional objection in his answer even though
he has previously appeared in the action. See note 48 supra. The inconsistency is
further aggravated where an action is commenced by service of a summons without
complaint. Defendant then must serve a timely notice of appearance in order to
avoid a technical default. However, the CPLR provides no method for raising
jurisdictional objections in the notice of appearance before service of the complaint.
WKM 3211.05. The problem has lost much of its significance since the words
"at the time of the appearance" have been eliminated from rule 320(b) by Concurrent
Resolution 174 of the New York Legislature, effective September 1, 1964.
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III. CONCLUSION
The excellences of the treatise reflected in its treatment of the area of
jurisdiction are confirmed by my general impressions of its treatment of
the other areas. I conclude that the treatise as a whole has satisfied com-
pletely two of the basic criteria by which such a work is to be judged-
the encyclopedic and the analytical, while at the same time fulfilling the
creative function as an incidental objective.
The encyclopedic objective of the treatise has been accomplished by
careful selection of the topics which deserve discussion. The authors exer-
cised wise discretion in deciding what to discuss and-sometimes equally
important-what to omit. Fulfillment of a misguided ambition to cover
every detail would have rendered the attainment of the analytical objective
more difficult. Too many other works are cluttered with disorganized
shreds of information which are of little informative and of even less
analytical value. True, there are instances when the researcher's hope of
finding a quick and authoritative answer to a specific problem arising under
the new statute will be frustrated. This is unavoidable and detracts nothing
from the overall value of the work.
Since the usefulness of a work of this size and scope depends in part
upon the accessibility of information without waste of time and effort it
may be appropriate to discuss briefly the format of the treatise. The
organization of the work is similar to that of Moore's Federal Practice.
The new New Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New York is
arranged in an organic and logical pattern, following roughly the chronology
of a law suit. This made it possible for the authors to cover the subject by
commenting on each provision in the sequence in which it appears in the
statute. The text of each section or rule is set forth in full,71 and is followed
by (i) a synopsis of topics which facilitates a quick reference to the specific
area of interest, and (ii) a valuable introductory statement which refers
the reader to the statutory antecedents of the CPLR, text materials, law
review articles, reports of legislative committees, and other significant study
materials and bibliographical references together with the applicable key
numbers of the National Reporter System for the reader's independent
research. This latter feature, which I have not seen in other textbooks,
should save countless hours of purely mechanical preliminary research.
The treatise is at its very best in the analytical exposition of the ma-
terial. The authors, taking great pains to make sure that the law is prop-
erly understood and applied by both Bench and Bar, assume the role of
guardians of the new law. They hold their protective hands over it in an
attempt to save it from destruction by misunderstanding, misconstruction,
and misapplication-a fate which befell the Field Code. The arrangement
71 The reader need not worry about the authenticity of the transcripts of the
text of the original laws since there is prefixed to each volume a certificate of the
Department of State of the State of New York certifying that the transcripts are
correct and entitled to be read in evidence. N.Y. PuB. OFFIcERs LAW § 70-b.
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and classification of the material is excellent, and the discussion is on a high
and scholarly level. The authors are sound in theory; yet, they are not
oblivious to the practical problems which confront the practitioner. With
unfailing skill they concentrate on fundamentals, laying aside unimportant
details, and penetrate through the mesh of rules to the depth of the problem.
Ample space is given to the historical background and evolution of pro-
cedural concepts. Clarity of thought, simplicity of language, and con-
ciseness of style are characteristics of their presentation. The authorities
are chosen with painstaking care. In their citations the authors follow
the great tradition of Wigmore who introduced the technique of stating
"in half a line the distinguishing facts of the case in such a way that a lawyer
searching the notes for authority may know at a glance which cases are
worth his examination." 72
In Wigmore's Evidence the exhaustive exposition of the existing law
usually is a preparatory step leading to the creative conclusions of the great
master. But perhaps the time for the creative treatise in the grand style
of Wigmore has passed. Today's creative efforts in legal writing find their
principal expression in specific research projects, legislative studies, and
law review articles which are more adaptable to the accelerated pace of the
development of the law. In the treatise under review, creativity on the
whole is secondary to the analytical objective. But it should be remembered
that much of the creative work of two of the three authors and their col-
laborators, including particularly the late Daniel H. Distler, to whose
memory the treatise is dedicated, preceded the writing of the treatise.
73
Over a period of six years, while the new law was in the making, they
undertook a series of pervasive and definitive studies dealing with a variety
of controversial problems which were published in five Preliminary Reports
of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure and in various law
review articles.74  The result of their labor found expression in the study
drafts of the Civil Practice Law and Rules of Civil Procedure on which
the new Civil Practice Law and Rules is based.
The authors are conscious of their creative responsibilities in those
instances where the CPLR deviates substantially from the preliminary
drafts. As originally conceived, the proposed new law and rules repre-
sented a modern code which incorporated some of the most advanced think-
ing in the area of procedure. Unfortunately, the CPLR as finally enacted
into law takes severe regressive steps. In many respects it bears little
resemblance to the preliminary drafts. To be sure, the form and also the
substance of the old law have been vastly improved, but a number of funda-
72 Book Review, 18 HARv. L. REv. 478 (1905).
73 Research and drafting of the proposed provisions for the Advisory Committee
were supervised by Professor Jack B. Weinstein, Reporter to the Advisory Committee.
Professor Daniel H. Distler (deceased) was Associate Reporter. Professor Harold
L. Korn was Director of Research. Professor Arthur R. Miller joined the team of
authors after the death of Professor Daniel H. Distler in 1962.
74 See list of law review articles in Summary of Civil Practice Law and Rules
Effective September 1, 1963, at 11-12 (Matthew Bender & Co. 1962).
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mental ideas incorporated in the original drafts were eliminated; others
were compromised beyond recognition.
The authors, who led the battle for improvement of the law, now are
placed in the role of the historians who, with unemotional precision and
guarded expression of regret, point to changes which were recommended
by the draftsmen, but rejected by the legislators. Notwithstanding their
detached treatment, the authors at times succeed remarkably well in
building up an impressive case for the vindication of their original ideas.
A good example is their critical treatment of CPLR article 31, entitled
"Disclosure." 75 Another example is the subtle handling of the "Dead
Man's Statute." 76 The legislature rejected a proposal of the revisers to
make the hearsay declarations of a deceased or insane person as well as the
testimony of the interested witness admissible in evidence and to require
the court or jury to "take into account the inability of the deceased or
insane person to contradict a witness and the fact that the deceased or in-
sane person is not subject to cross-examination." 77 The treatise deftly
sets forth the proposed provision,7 the reasons for the proposal, 79 and a
transcript, in excerpt, of the verbal duel between the warring factions at a
panel discussion of the New York State Bar Association during its 1960
summer meeting. The transcript speaks for itself, and will be more effective
to win converts for the revisers' cause than would have been a polemic
statement by the authors.80 Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that
the treatment of the entire subject of evidence and of res judicata, both con-
tained in volume five of the treatise, excels in originality of approach and
exhaustiveness of coverage.
The authors are less effective in another vital area of the law. The
rulemaking power, as originally proposed, would have lodged rulemaking
in the Judicial Conference in all matters of procedure except those in-
volving fundamental policy.81 However, the law as finally enacted con-
fines rulemaking power by the courts to a bare minimum; thus one of
the essential earmarks of a flexible modern system of procedure was dis-
carded. I would have welcomed a more positive stand and a more forceful
75 Instead of adopting the revisers' streamlined version of a modern disclosure
proceeding, the legislature, at the behest of a negligence bar which still clings to
the old "sporting theory of justice," restored the former law. For example, the scope
of disclosure was narrowed drastically from "full disclosure before trial of all relevant
evidence and all information reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence," as
originally proposed, N.Y. TEMPORARY COMM!'N ON THE COURTS (ADvIsoRY Comb'N
ON PRAcrIc & PROCEDURE, FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT 117 (1957), to "all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action," N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW & RULES § 3101 (a). This seemingly is even more restrictive wording than that
contained in the old Civil Practice Act § 288 because of the use of the word "evidence"
which did not appear in the prior law. But see WKM 3101.04.
70 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES §4519.
77 N.Y. TEMPORARY COMM'N ON THE COURTS (ADvisoRY ComM'N ON PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE), SECOND PRELIMINARY REPORT 268 (1958).
78 WKM 114519.01.
7WKM 1 4519.02.
80 WM 1[ 4519.03.
81 See Preface to WKM x, xi, xii; WKM 1 102.01-.02.
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expression of the authors' views in this area where, in deference to the
sentiments of a legislature intent on preserving its prerogative in procedural
matters, principle was sacrificed to political expedience.
Notwithstanding the few entries on the debit side of the balance sheet,
the credit balance is overwhelming. The Bench and Bar, as well as law
teachers and students, are indebted to the authors for giving us this com-
prehensive treatise on present-day New York civil procedure. In scope
of coverage, originality of approach, and depth of analysis, it measures up to
the highest standards. I predict that the work will be used by the Bar as an
indispensable tool in the daily work of the practitioner; it will be quoted
by courts and relied upon by scholars. There is no doubt in my mind that
it will take its well-earned place among the important treatises of legal
science.
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THE LIn OF THE LAW. Edited by John Honnold. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xiv, 581. $10.00.
LOCATION AND LAND USE. By William Alonso. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 204. $5.50.
THE MORALITY OF THE LAW. By Lon L. Fuller. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1964. Pp. viii, 202. $5.00.
OPERATIONAL ECONOMICS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES. By Constantine W. Bary. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv, 221. $10.00.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. (2d ed.) By Carl Joachim
Friedrich. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 296. $1.95.
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By the Attorney
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice.
Washington: 1963. Pp. 154.
PROPAGANDA. By John B. Whitton and Arthur Larson. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publi-
cations, 1964. Pp. xi, 305. $8.50.
PSYCHOTiERAPY IN OuR SociETY. By Theron Alexander. Englewood Cliffs; Pren-
tice-Hall, 1963. Pp. ix, 181. $1.95.
THE QUEST FOR THE DREAM. By John P. Roche. New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1963. Pp. xii, 308. $5.95.
READINGS IN ADOPTION. Edited by I. Evelyn Smith. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1963. Pp. 532. $7.50.
THE REINs OF POWER. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: Hill & Wang, 1963.
Pp. 216. $4.50.
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER: 1963. Edited by Donald A. Giannella. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. x, 338.
RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Robert F. Drinan. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1963. Pp. vi, 261. $5.95.
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE. Washington: G. P. 0., 1963. Pp. 154.
REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY LAW. Edited by Pierre Cot. Brussels: International
Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1962. Pp. 162.
7 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW. Edited by Folke Schmidt. Sweden: Almqvist
& Wiksell, 1963. Pp. 260.
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SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Brainerd Currie. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1963. Pp. x, 761. $15.00.
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW. By Roscoe Pound. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.
Pp. xviii, 224. $1.75.
THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1963-64. Edited by S. H. Steinberg. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1963. Pp. xxxvi, 1728. $10.00.
THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER. By Charles E. Rice. New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 202. $5.00.
THE SUPRmE COURT REVIEW. Edited by Philip B. Kurland. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 356. $6.50.
TAx POLICY ON UNITED STATES INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMRIrCA. Princeton: Tax
Institute of America, 1963. Pp. xii, 275. $7.00.
TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW. Edited by George W. Hardy, III.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 180. $7.50.
A TEXT-BOOK OF JURIPSRUDENCF. (3d ed.) By George Whitecross Paton. Edited by
David P. Derham. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 600. $8.80.
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND. By Stanley D. Metzger. Fairfax:
Coiner Publications, 1964. Pp. vii, 119, plus appendix. $5.95.
1 TuDoR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: THE EARLY TuDORS, 1485-1553. Edited by Paul
L. Hughes and James F. Larkin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
Pp. xlvi, 642. $17.50.
THE WALL STREXr LAWYER. By Erwin 0. Smigel. New York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1964. Pp. ix, 369. $6.95.
YESTERDAY'S LAWS AND TODAY'S ACCIDENTS. By Ella Graubart. Pittsburgh: The
Boxwood Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 97. $1.95.
